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Abstract—Emerging Non-Volatile Memories (NVMs) are
promising contenders for building future memory systems. On
the other side, unlike DRAM systems, NVMs can retain data even
after power loss and thus enlarge the attack surface. While data
encryption and integrity verification have been proposed earlier
for DRAM systems, protecting and recovering secure memories
becomes more challenging with persistent memory. Specifically,
security metadata, e.g., encryption counters and Merkle Tree
data, should be securely persisted and recovered across system
reboots and during recovery from crashes. Not persisting updates
to security metadata can lead to data inconsistency, in addition
to serious security vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we pioneer a new direction that explores per-
sistency of both Merkle Tree and encryption counters to enable
secure recovery of data-verifiable and encrypted memory systems.
To this end, we coin a new concept that we call Persistent-Security.
We discuss the requirements for such persistently secure systems,
propose novel optimizations, and evaluate the impact of the
proposed relaxation schemes and optimizations on performance,
resilience and recovery time. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the first to discuss the persistence of security metadata
in integrity-protected NVM systems and provide corresponding
optimizations. We define a set of relaxation schemes that bring
trade-offs between performance and recovery time for large
capacity NVM systems. Our results show that our proposed
design, Triad-NVM, can improve the throughput by an average
of 2x (relative to strict persistence). Moreover, Triad-NVM
maintains a recovery time of less than 4 seconds for an 8TB
NVM system (30.6 seconds for 64TB), which is 3648x faster
than a system without security metadata persistence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securing Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) systems is a critical
requirement for their deployment. Unlike DRAM, NVMs retain
data after powering off the system, which necessiates encrypting
them to avoid data remenance attacks. Moreover, NVMs enable
persistent applications which can recover after a crash by
frequently persisting their data on NVMs. However, while
both concepts, persistency and security, seem orthogonal, they
become naturally relevant with emerging NVMs; the system
should be able to recover securely and guarantee its data
integrity and confidentiality across crashes. Unfortunately, such
synergy between persistency and security has received limited
attention from the research community, which we believe is due
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to the following reasons. First, securing memory systems, e.g.,
encryption and data integrity verification, has been originally
developed for DRAM systems to defeat cold-boot attacks [1],
[2], [3]. In such systems, persistency and data recovery is
not anticipated and thus all security metadata are expected
to be reinitialized [4]. Second, the research on encrypting
and securing NVMs has been mostly focused on performance
of normal-operation without consideration of maintaining
consistency across crashes [5], [6], [7], [8]. Third, persisting
data in emerging NVMs has many compelling models, notably
JUSTDO logging [9] and epoch-based persistence [10], where
the focus is on data persistency than its accompanying security
metadata [11], [12], [13], [14].
While the Asynchronous DRAM Refresh (ADR) feature
has been a requirement for many NVM form factors, e.g.,
NVDIMM [15], most processor vendors limit persistent do-
mains within the processor chip to tens of entries in the write
pending queue (WPQ)[16]. The main reason is the high costs
for ensuring a long-lasting sustainable power supply in case of
power loss in addition to the power-consuming nature of NVM
writes. As security metadata can be hundreds of kilobytes
or megabytes, the system-level ADR support would fail to
guarantee the persistence of all their updated values within the
processor chip. For many users, affording powerfull backup
batteries or deploying expensive power-supplies is infeasible,
either due to environmental, limited area or cost limitations,
thus battery-free solutions are always in demand[17].
Recently, several work have explored persisting encryption
counters on secure NVMs [18], [17], [19]. Unfortunately, none
of the previous work investigate persisting integrity protected
systems and its accompanying metadata, but rather limit their
schemes to encryption counters only. In fact, persisting integrity-
verification metadata has much higher overhead. Moreover,
most of the previous work do not clearly define which security
metadata need to be persisted and the impact of relaxing
the persistence of such metadata on security, recovery time,
resilience, performance and write endurance. In summary,
the current literature in persisting security metadata lacks
the following: 1 Solid definition of what data needs to be
persisted in secure memory systems, especially for systems
with integrity protection. 2 Complete understanding of the
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impact of relaxing security persistence, e.g., selective counter
persistence [18], on security and best practices that must
accompany such relaxation schemes. 3 Understanding of
the impact of different relaxation schemes on recovery time
and resilience of the system, i.e., possibility of recovery failure.
To address all these shortcomings, we first discuss the problem
of persisting security metadata in integrity-protected secure
systems. Later, we define a new concept, Persistent Security,
which defines the requirements for securely recovering integrity-
protected and encrypted memory systems. Finally, we discuss
several relaxation schemes and a comprehensive design that
leverages them to optimize performance.
To reduce the overhead of persisting Merkle Tree and encryp-
tion counters after each update, we propose Triad-NVM, a novel
design that leverages four key insights: 1 Current systems
and support for NVM clearly define regions of the NVM
device that can be used as persistent memory, e.g., initializing
the Linux kernel with the parameter memmap=4G!12G, can
be used to dedicate the 4GB starting from address 12GB
to be mounted/mapped as persistent memory. 2 Being able
to spatially divide the address space into persistent and non-
persistent regions allows to partition Merkle Tree vertically
into persistent and non-persistent subtrees. While prior work
[18] distinguish between persistent and non-persistent data
through modifying applications to explicitly hint hardware
and memory controller, we observe that such modifications
might be not needed if persistent regions are well-defined and
spatially distinguishable. 3 Merkle Tree can be reconstructed
after a crash by only ensuring the persistence of low levels,
however, at the cost of resilience (single-point of failure) and
recovery time. 4 Building Merkle Tree for Non-Persistent
regions at recovery time can be very expensive, however, it
can be mitigated by encoding special values at some levels of
the Merkle Tree during recovery.
To evaluate our design, we use Gem5 [20], a full-system
cycle-accurate simulator. We use Linux kernel version 4.14
along with a disk image based on Ubuntu 16.04. Additionally,
we initialize the kernel to dedicate the last 4GB (out of 16GB)
as a persistent region, which we later mount as a directly-
accessible (DAX) ext4 filesystem. The persistent region can be
used by any library that supports persistent memory, however,
we opt for using Intel’s PMDK library [21] (previously known
as PMEM) to build 3 microbenchmarks, in addition to 4 DAX-
based synthetic workloads, along with 12 benchmarks from the
SPEC2006 suite [22]. We additionally evaluate 4 workloads
that run combinations of persistent (PMDK and DAX) and
non-persistent (SPEC) workloads. Our simulation results show
that Triad-NVM can improve the throughput by an average
of 2x (relative to strict persistence). Moreover, Triad-NVM
maintains a recovery time of less than 4 seconds for an 8TB
NVM system (30.6 seconds for 64TB), which is 3648x faster
than a system without security metadata persistence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss
the problem and background of secure NVM systems in Section
II, where we also discuss the conventional way of persisting
security metadata in secure NVMs. Later, in Section III, we
discuss the requirements of strictly-persistent secure memory
systems. Later, we discuss different relaxation schemes and
their impact on security, performance and resiliency of NVM
systems. In Section IV, we discuss our evaluation methodology.
Our results and discussion of our evaluation are presented in
Section V. Section VI discusses the most relevant work to our
paper. Finally, we conclude our work in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
We will start our section with background discussion
followed by demonstrating the issue of crash consistency of
security metadata. Later, we present motivational data of the
impact of the problem.
A. Background
Emerging Non-Volatile Memories (NVMs), such as Intel’s
and Micron’s 3D XPoint [23], are just around the corner and
they are expected to be on the market soon. Unlike DRAM,
they feature high-density, ultra-low idle power (no need to
refresh cells), low latency and persistence of data [24], [25],
[26]. Due to their ability to retain data across system reboots,
they can be also used to store files and persistent data structures.
Hence, NVMs can be used as a memory and a storage device
at the same time. Specifically, NVM-based DIMMs can be
used to hold files and also regular memory pages, and can
be accessed in a way similar to DRAM through load/store
operations. To realize this, new Operating Systems (OSes)
started to support configuring the memory as both filesystem
and conventional memory. In particular, recent linux kernels
and Windows started to support directly-access (DAX) support
filesystems [27]. In DAX supported filesystems, e.g., ext4
with DAX, a file can be directly memory-mapped and accessed
through typical load/store operations, however, without the need
to copy its pages to page cache as in conventional filesystems.
For example, the NVM memory can be configured to have
a part dedicated to hold filesystem. In linux systems, when
initializing the kernel, the parameter memmap=4G!12G can
be used to dedicate the 4GB starting from address 12GB to
directly-accessible filesystems. Thus, the same memory chip
will be accessed for both files and conventional memory pages.
1) NVM Security: Due to non-volatility, emerging NVMs
facilitate data remenance attacks; data remains there even after
losing power. Accordingly, emerging NVMs are commonly
coupled with memory encryption and data integrity verifica-
tion. State-of-the-art secure NVM systems use counter-mode
encryption[6], [7], [18]. Counter-mode encryption can protect
against replay attacks, scanning memory and bus snooping
attacks. Counter-mode memory encryption associates a counter
with each 64B block in memory and this counter changes each
time the corresponding block is being written to memory and
the new counter value will be used to do the encryption. The
most-recent value of the counter must be book-kept to be later
used for decryption. In counter-mode encryption, repeating the
same counter value can result in serious security vulnerabilities,
e.g., known-plaintext attacks. To avoid replaying counters, they
are typically protected against tampering through Merkle Tree.
State-of-the-art work, e.g., Bonsai Merkle Tree [4], applies
Merkle Tree over the encryption counters and protects data
through computing MAC value over ciphertext and data.
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Fig. 1: Example Merkle Tree.
As shown in Figure 1, each encryption counter, which is
associated with a data block, is used to calculate a hash value
(MAC) that will be used along with other hash values from
other groups of counters to create a lower level hash value.
Finally, the resulting MAC value, which is called root, is kept in
the processor. Each time a counter is brought from the insecure
area, e.g., memory module, it will be verified by calculating
the upper hash values and see if the result matches the root
kept in the processor. Furthermore, when the processor writes
a memory block and updates the corresponding counter, the
Merkle Tree intermediate nodes and root should be updated to
reflect the most-recent change.
2) Memory Counter-Mode Encryption: In counter-mode
encryption, the encryption algorithm, e.g., AES, takes ini-
tialization vector (IV) as its input to create a one-time pad
(OTP) as explained in Figure 2. Later, when the block arrives
the processor chip, a low-cost bitwise XOR with the pad
(encrypted IV) is needed to obtain the plaintext. By doing so,
the decryption latency is hidden by the memory access latency.
In our paper, we use state-of-the-art design for organizing
encryption counter, split-counter scheme [6], [4], where each
IV consists of a unique ID of a page (to distinguish between
swap space and main memory space), page offset (to guarantee
different blocks in a page will get different IVs), a per-block
minor counter (to make the same value encrypted differently
when written again to the same address), and a per-page major
counter (to guarantee uniqueness of IV when minor counters
overflow).
AES-ctr 
mode 
Page
ID
Page
Offset
Major
Counter
Minor
Counter PaddingIV
Key
Block to 
Write Back
Fetched Block
(from NVMM)
Ciphertext
(to NVMM)
Plaintext
(to cache)
Counter Cache
Major
Ctr Minor counters
Pad XOR XOR
Fig. 2: State-of-the-art counter mode encryption as in [6]
As in previous work [6], [18], [17], [28], [4], [7], we assume
counter-mode memory encryption. In addition to its perfor-
mance advantages, it also provides strong security defenses
against a wide range of attacks. Counter-mode encryption is
secure against dictionary-based attacks, known-plaintext attacks,
bus snooping and replay attacks. In split-counter scheme, the
encryption counters are organized as major counters (shared
between cache blocks of the same page) and minor counters
that are specific for each cache block [4]. Such organization
allows packing 64 cache blocks’ counters in a 64B block;
7-bit minor counters and 64-bit major counter. Major counters
are incremented when one of its minor counters overflows,
in which all corresponding minor counters will be reset and
the whole page will be re-encrypted using the new major
counter[4]. When the major counter of a page overflows (64-
bit counter), a new key is generated and the memory contents
will be re-encrypted using the new key. Split-counter scheme
provides significant reduction of memory re-encryption rate and
minimizes the storage overhead of encryption counters when
compared to other schemes, e.g., monolithic counter scheme
or independent counter for each cache block. Moreover, split-
counter exploits the spatial locality of encryption counters,
and hence achieves a higher counter cache hit rate. Similar to
state-of-the-art work [6], [29], [5], [4], we use split-counter
scheme for organizing the encryption counters.
3) Impact of Persistency on Security: As persistent memory
can be utilized to store checkpoints and recover from crashes,
the accompanying security metadata should be persisted too.
For instance, we mentioned earlier that the counter used for
encryption will be updated on each write operation of the
associated memory block, however, such update can occur on
a volatile counter cache inside the processor chip, hence not
persisted to the NVM memory. Accordingly, the data block
could be encrypted with the new counter value and written to
NVM, but the counter is not updated in memory. Clearly, if
a crash occurs, a stale counter value will be used to do the
decryption, which will result in incorrect decryption. While the
recovery of non-persistent data is not important, it is critical
to avoid reusing their counters’ previous values; repeating an
old (not persisted) counter will result in a reuse of OTP that
could have been observed earlier, which results in security
vulnerabilities as described below.
4) Attack on Reusing Counters for Non-Persistent Data: As
described by Ye et al.[17], assume an adversarial application
uses known-plaintext and writes it to memory, however, if the
memory location is non-persistent, the encrypted data will be
written to memory but the counter might be not updated in
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memory yet. By observing the memory bus, the attacker can
learn the encryption pad, i.e., OTP, by XOR’ing the observed
ciphertext, (Ekey(IVnew)⊕ Plaintext), with the Plaintext.
Even worse, it is also possible to predict the plaintext for
initial accesses, for instance, zeroing at first access. To this
end, the attacker knows the encryption pad, i.e., Ekey(IVnew).
Later, after recovering from a crash, the memory controller
will fetch IVold and increment it, which generates IVnew, and
then uses it to encrypt the new data written to that location to
become Ekey(IVnew) ⊕ Plaintext2. As the attacker knows
the encryption pad, revealing the value of Plaintext2 only
can be done by XORing the ciphertext with the previously
observed encryption pad, i.e., Ekey(IVnew). Note that the stale
counter could have been incremented multiple times before
the crash, hence multiple writes of the new application can
reuse counters with known encryption pads. Note that such
an attack only need a malicious application to run (or just
predictable initial plaintext of an application) and having a
physical attacker.
B. Security Metadata Crash Consistency
After a crash occurs, the system must be able to recover and
restore its encrypted memory data along with its accompanying
security metadata. Figure 3 discusses the logical steps needed
for crash consistency as described by Ye et al.[17].
Merkle Tree
Counters
Data
NVM Memory
Secure Processor (Trusted Chip)
LLC...
MT 
Cache
Counter 
Cache
MT Root
Memory 
Controller 
+
Encryption
Engine
1
2
3
Fig. 3: Description of write process that ensures crash consis-
tency.
As depicted by Figure 3, the root of the Merkle tree (on-
chip) should be updated/persisted (as shown in step 1 ) along
with affected intermediate nodes inside the processor. However,
only the root of the Merkle Tree needs to be kept in the secure
region.
In Step 2 , the updated counter block is written back to
memory as it gets updated in the counter cache. Counters are
critical to keep and persist to avoid having the security of the
counter-mode encryption be compromised. Note that even if
the data is not expected to be recovered, the counters must be
persisted to avoid repetition. While losing counter values can
cause inability to restore encrypted memory data. Liu et al. [18]
observe that it is possible to only persist counters of persistent
data structures (or subset of them) to enable consistent recovery.
Unfortunately, this can lead to serious security vulnerabilities as
discussed earlier; reusing counter values even for non-persistent
memory locations can compromise the security of the counter-
mode encryption. Moreover, modifying applications to expose
their persistent ranges to the memory controller is challenging,
especially for legacy applications.
Finally, in Step 3 , the written data block will be sent to
the memory.
C. Motivation
As we now understand the issue of guaranteeing security
metadata crash consistency, let’s now discuss the impact of
ensuring such consistency on performance of Non-Volatile
Memories (NVMs). As mentioned earlier, a strictly persistent
secure system would persist any changes to Merkle Tree and the
corresponding encryption counter before each memory write
operation. Figure 41 depicts the relative system throughput
when using strict persistent security.
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Fig. 4: Performance Overhead of Persisting Security Metadata.
As shown in Figure 4, most workloads get severe per-
formance degradation due to the impact of additional write
operations to ensure persistency of security metadata. Notably,
some workloads can be slowed down by as much as 9.4x
compared to a system that does not guarantee such type of
persistency. The impact of persisting security metadata depends
mainly on the memory behavior and write-intensity of the
running applications. Unfortunately, with such performance
overheads, most users would avoid enabling persistent security
which would leave their systems insecure and potentially their
data unrecoverable. To address this issue, in this paper, we
define the requirements of persistently-secure systems and study
the impact of different schemes on performance, recovery time
and resilience of the system. To the best of our knowledge,
our paper is the first to discuss the issue of persisting both
encryption counters and Merkle tree in NVM-based systems.
III. DESIGN
In this section, we first define the requirements of persistently
secure systems. Later, we discuss the different design options
that can be adopted for the purpose of implementing persistently
secure systems. Finally, we discuss our proposed design that
combines several novel optimizations.
1More details about the workload and methodology can be found in Section
IV
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A. Persistently Secure Systems
In order to start our discussion of the requirements of
persistently secure system, let’s first formally define such
systems.
Definition 1:
A Persistently Secure System is any secure system
that is capable of recovering its security metadata, e.g.,
encryption counters and Merkle Tree, in case of power-
loss or system crash. Such a system should be able
to verify that any (persistent) memory data being read
after the crash reflects the most-recent value before or
after system recovery. Specifically, if using counter-mode
encryption, such a system should guarantee that one-time
pads are never repeated regardless of the nature (persistent
or non-persistent) of their corresponding data.
As mentioned earlier, state-of-the-art designs for secure
NVMs deploy counter-mode encryption along with an op-
timized Merkle Tree that protects tampering with data and
encryption counters. Two key requirements for such schemes
1 Never repeat the same counter without changing the key 2
Ensure that the Merkle Tree root reflects the most-recent state
of the memory. The hierarchical implementation of Merkle
Tree is meant for reducing the overhead of verification in case
of read operation; if you read a counter that has the most-
recent value of its parent node being cached in the processor
chip, i.e., has been already verified, then there is no need to
go further (to upper levels) in the Merkle Tree. Similarly, if
its grand-parent node is present but its immediate parent is
not, then only the immediate parent needs to be fetched from
memory and verified to match its hash value in its parent node
and then the counter/leaf will be verified against its hash value
in its fetched parent.
Verifying the counters being fetched from memory would
require accessing all its parents up to the first one hits in the
cache, which will be the root in the worst case. However, given
the spatial locality of most applications, most applications
rarely need to access more than few levels from memory.
Unfortunately, the write operation is quite different; all upper
levels must be updated including the root of the Merkle Tree.
As NVMs are expected to have huge capacities, e.g., tens
of TBs, the height of the Merkle Tree is expected to be in
order of tens of levels, which would require updating tens of
intermediate nodes blocks. Even worse, to achieve persistence
of such security metadata, we need to persist each updated
intermediate node block in the NVM. This brings us to the
discussion of the requirements of implementing persistently
secure systems.
1 Encryption Counters: While losing the most recent values
of encryption counters of non-persistent data structures or
data would likely not affect the correctness of the system, it
can compromise its security as discussed earlier. Accordingly,
to prevent such security vulnerability, encryption counters
should be strictly persisted or there must be a guarantee of not
repeating one-time pads.
2 Merkle Tree: Persisting Merkle Tree updates is necessary
to ensure the system ability of verifying encryption counters
when recovered. However, we observe that not all parts of the
Merkle Tree need to be persisted. Instead, just persisting the
lowest levels of Merkle Tree is sufficient to rebuild the whole
Merkle Tree at the time of recovery, however, at the cost of
creating a single-point of failure and increasing recovery time
as we will discuss later.
1) Encryption Counters Persistence: Encryption counters
of persistent data must be updated strictly before updating the
data to ensure consistent recovery of data. Meanwhile, as also
observed by Liu et al.[18], counters of non-persistent data do
not need to be strictly persisted. However, while prior work
[18] completely relaxes the persistence of such counters, we
argue that we additionally need to ensure that such counters
should never repeat with the same encryption key. Later, we
will discuss a scheme that relaxes counters of non-persistent
data while ensuring that they will never repeat. Meanwhile, the
encryption counters of persistent data will be strictly persisted
before updating their corresponding data.
Observation 1: Encryption counters of persistent data must
be persisted and up-to-date during normal operation and across
system failures/crashes. In contrast, for non-persistent data, the
encryption counters must be up-to-date during normal operation
and guaranteed not to repeat old values after recovering from
crash.
C C
NVM
File
Pmem
Non-PersistentPersistent
... C C C C...
Encryption Counters for Persistent Data Encryption Counters for Non-Persistent Data
Fig. 5: Encryption counters for data with different persistency
requirements.
2) Merkle Tree Persistence: While Merkle Tree covers all
encryption counters, regardless of their persistence require-
ments, not all parts of the Merkle Tree need to be persisted.
Specifically, given that current systems define the persistent
regions of the NVM during bootup time, there is a range in
memory that is guaranteed not to be used for persistent data.
For instance, if the Linux Kernel defines the first 4GB of
memory to be used for persistent memory, i.e., can be mounted
and used by PMEM and DAX applications, then other parts
of the memory do not ensure any persistence of data. Thus,
persisting the updates to Merkle Tree intermediate nodes that
only cover non-persistent regions might be relaxed as long as
this ensures integrity during the normal operation.
Observation 2: For non-persistent data, it is important to
ensure their integrity during run-time, however, after a crash,
we are no longer concerned about their values being lost or
tampered with. In contrast, for persistent data, the data and
counters integrity must be ensured during normal operation
and across system failures/crashes.
Based on the above observation, a Merkle Tree can be
subdivided into multiple subtrees, i.e., some parts only cover
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Fig. 6: Updating Merkle for counters correspond to data with different persistency requirements.
the first 4GB of the main memory as aforementioned, hence
only that part of the tree needs to be persisted strictly. In
other words, the Merkle Tree can be vertically divided into
persistent and non-persistent tree. We also observe that just
persisting the leaves of the Merkle Tree is sufficient to allow its
reconstruction, however, this can increase the recovery time and
create single-point of failure, which would require additional
fault isolation mechanisms.
B. Relaxed Schemes
In this part of the paper, we will discuss several optimizations
and their potential impacts.
1) Relaxed-but-Secure Persistence of Encryption Counters:
To understand this scheme, let’s first discuss how current
systems adopt persistent memory. In current systems, at the time
of bootup, the kernel is initialized with a value that determines
which range of the memory module is considered persistent.
Such region can be formatted and mounted as a filesystem, e.g.,
ext4 filesystem. Additionally, such persistent region can be
used by persistency APIs, such as PMDK, which would backup
the persistent data structures by files in the persistent region.
Any file in the persistent region can be memory-mmaped, i.e.,
mmap’ed, and accessed through typical load/store operations.
Meanwhile, the non-persistent region in the NVM device is not
ensured recoverability after a crash; an application will only
be able to access data persisted to the persistent region after
recovery. Figure 5 depicts a system with encryption counters of
persistent and non-persistent regions in an NVM device. Note
that such distinction between persistency of regions does not
require modifying applications to explicitly define persistent
data structures and exposure them to hardware as in prior work
[18].
As we now understand how future NVM devices will be
leveraged by OS, let’s now discuss how encryption counters
should be treated differently based on that. While encryption
counters of persistent data must be recovered correctly for both
correctness and security reasons, those of non-persistent data
can be relaxed from ensuring correctness after recovery. The
only requirement of encryption counters of non-persistent data
is that they should not produce a previously used one-time pad,
which we can ensure by using a different encryption key.
Based on our observation that non-persistent data can lose
their most-recent counter values after recovery, however, they
should be never reused with the same key, we devise a design
that uses two different keys. One key, which we refer to by
Persistent Key, and the other key which we refer to by Volatile
Key. The persistent key is used for encrypting/decrypting
persistent data regions, whereas the volatile key is used for
non-persistent data. The volatile key will be changed after each
system reboot or recovering from crash, which allows us to
securely relax the persistence of encryption counters of non-
persistent data. Our design only requires modifying the memory
controller to be able to receive a command from the kernel
which notifies the MC about the start and end address of the
persistent region, and to use such information to decide which
key to use. Moreover, the kernel needs to send the memory
controller, through a memory-mapped register, a command to
change the volatile key at the time of recovery or reboot.
Observation 3: In systems with persistent and non-persistent
regions, if counter-mode encryption scheme is employed,
separate keys can be used for each region. As encryption
counters of the non-persistent region can repeat due to optional
persistence necessity, the key used for such region must be
changed after recovery or system reboot. By doing so, even if
the same IV gets reused, the one-time pad will be different:
Ekey1(IV ) 6= Ekey2(IV ). Thus, updating encryption counters
of non-persistent data can occur in counter-cache and use a
write-back scheme instead of write-through.
2) Relaxed-Persistence Subtrees of Merkle Tree: As we have
discussed in the prior part, some parts of the memory are not
expected to recover data correctly after a crash. However, such
regions require that their integrity be protected during normal
run-time, but do not have any expectation of integrity-protection
after recovery from crash as the data will be discarded anyway.
To better understand how an optimized scheme that relaxes
persistence of non-persistent sub-trees of Merkle Tree, Figure 6
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shows how Merkle Tree can be updated based on the persistency
requirement of the underlying data.
As depicted in Figure 6, when an update occurs for a
persistent memory location, all the corresponding parts for
such location in Merkle Tree at all levels should be updated
up to the root (inside the processor chip). Updates to Merkle
Tree for persistent data should be updating both the memory
copy and the cache copy of 1 The root of the Merkle Tree,
2 The root’s child node that owns the updated counter, and
all other intermediate nodes correspond to the updated counter.
Finally, as in 4 , updating the counter in both the memory
and counter cache. Note that, for non-persistent data, updating
the intermediate nodes and counters in the cache and lazily
write it back to memory is sufficient. Clearly, the subtrees that
belong to persistent regions should be separable, i.e., some
parts of the root only belongs to persistent-region and others
only to non-persistent regions. Having some parts belong to
both is challenging can lead to unverifiable parts after recovery;
that part will reflect most-recent values of both types of data,
but we will be unable of reproducing the root due to the lost
updates of intermediate nodes and counters of non-persistent
data. The only level that has MAC values on the same block
for both persistent and non-persistent data is the root, however,
they are clearly separable. To avoid cases of MAC values cover
both types of data, the memory space ratio between persistent
and persistent-data should 0:8, 1:7, 2:6, 3:5, 4:4, 5:3, 6:2, 7:1
or 8:0. In other words, each MAC value in the root should
cover either persistent or non-persistent data but not both. Note
that updates to the root does not need to be updated in memory
as it is guaranteed to be persistent in the processor, i.e., in a
NVM register inside the processor.
Observation 4: Merkle Tree can be logically divided into
subtrees that either belong to persistent data or non-persistent
data. Due to the architectural layout of the tree, the ratio of
persistent to non-persistent data is limited to specific values
that guarantee each MAC value in the root belongs to either
persistent or non-persistent data. To this end, the Merkle Tree
subtrees that belong to the non-persistent ranges can be updated
in the MT cache and lazily updated in memory when written
back.
3) Bottom-Up Merkle Tree Persistence: As we discussed
in the previous part on how to divide Merkle Tree vertically
into persistent and non-persistent subtrees, we now will discuss
which levels of Merkle Tree need to be updated and the impact
of possible relaxation schemes.
Unlike encryption counters, Merkle Tree intermediate nodes
can be rebuilt if lost and their main use is to speed up
verification and updating the root of the Merkle Tree. However,
if encryption counters are guaranteed to be strictly persistent
and up-to-date, then after a crash it is possible to rebuild all
levels of intermediate nodes all the way up to the root which
needs to match the root value in the processor. While this looks
like a straight-forward optimization, it can actually create a
single-point of failure; if any counter has been corrupted, e.g.,
due to memory error, we can only know that the Merkle
Tree root has not matched and thus none of the memory is
integrity-verifiable. While a Merkle Tree root can hold 64B
instead of only 8B values, still an uncorrectable counter error
would result in 18 th of the memory being lost/unverifiable. As
emerging NVMs are expected to contain terabytes of data, the
chance that an uncorrectable error of any counter can lead
to large part of memory being unverifiable is unacceptable.
Moreover, only guaranteeing the persistence of encryptions
would require high recovery time due to the need of iterating
over all encryption counters to rebuild all levels of Merkle
Tree.
To enable high-resolution of identifying unverifiable loca-
tions in addition to keep the recovery time manageable, we
propose persisting the first N levels of the Merkle Tree (from
bottom to up) while optionally maintaining several NVM
registers within the processor. The value of N depends on
the acceptable performance/recovery-time trade-off. Persisting
low levels of Merkle Tree can help isolating problems and iden-
tifying which counters are corrupted/uncorrectable. Moreover,
more number of levels being guaranteed persistence allows
shorter recovery time to reconstruct the Merkle Tree. Also
note that since higher levels of the Merkle Tree has much less
intermediate nodes, persisting them reduces the chances of the
inability to construct Merkle Tree due to uncorrectable errors.
Observation 5:
Persisting parts of the Merkle Tree can avoid single-point
of failures resulting from uncorrectable errors of encryption
counters. Moreover, it reduces the Merkle Tree recovery time by
reducing the number of levels need to be rebuilt after recovery.
Internal NVM registers inside the processor can be also used
to hold upper levels of Merkle Tree, e.g., root’s immediate
children and grand children (a total of 73 blocks), thus it can
declare only a small percentage of memory unverifiable in
case uncorrectable errors corrupt encryption counters or the
persisted parts of the Merkle Tree.
C. Triad-NVM
Our design that includes all of the proposed optimizations
is referred to as Triad-NVM. Triad-NVM logically divides
the Merkle Tree into subtrees, persistent and non-persistent.
Moreover, it strictly persists counters that belong to persistent
regions. Finally, for persistent regions, the Merkle Tree must
be reconstructed after crash, thus it is necessary to ensure
resiliency through persisting additional levels as configured by
system owner or recommended by the system architects. For
non-persistent regions, there is no need to ensure reconstruction
of the corresponding subtree of the Merkle Tree, thus updates
to such subtree are not strictly persisted.
At the recovery time, the Merkle Tree has to be reconstructed
again to be able verify any tampering. During recovery, before
admitting the current status of the system as verified, all
persistent locations need to be verified through reconstructing
the corresponding parts of the Merkle Tree and verifying that
it generates a correct root. This ensures that the data has not
been tampered with from (or before) crash time till recovery
time. However, for non-persistent data locations, while we do
not need to verify the integrity of data at the recovery time,
we need to be able to verify it after recovery. Thus, Merkle
Tree subtrees that correspond to non-persistent regions should
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be constructed. Now the question is how can we do that in an
efficient way.
Reconstructing Subtree of Non-Persistent Region: As men-
tioned earlier, in state-of-the-art schemes, e.g., Bonsai Merkle
Tree [28], the MAC values stored with data are calculated
over data and encryption counters and hence all data and
its accompanying MAC values need to be reinitialized based
on the updated counter values after recovery. Note that since
persisting updates to Merkle Tree and counters of non-persistent
data is relaxed, there is no guarantee that the recovered
counter values are similar to those used to calculate the MAC
values accompanying their corresponding data. Accordingly,
there will be inconsistency that will result in errors and
mistakenly flagging tampering/errors during normal operations
after recovery.
Unfortunately, it is very time-consuming to iterate over all
non-persistent data to reinitialize counters, data and its MAC
values. To better understand the overhead, let’s assume a 6TB of
NVM, where 50% is used as non-persistent data, i.e., normal
memory. At recovery time, if reading each data block and
initializing it takes 100ns, then just iterating over the 3TB
(non-persistent region) would take 5154 seconds (almost 85.9
minutes). However, for the persistent data (the other 3TB), since
the low-levels of Merkle Tree along with data and counters have
been strictly persisted, only the upper levels of Merkle Tree.
For instance, if only the first level of Merkle Tree (the parents
of counter blocks), and reading each block and calculating its
MAC values takes 100ns, then that will take only 92 seconds
( 1.5 minutes). For more aggressive persistence of Merkle Tree
such as up to level 2 (the grandparents of counter blocks), then
the construction time will take only 11.5 seconds.
Observation 6:
Relaxing the persistence of Merkle Tree parts and counters
that correspond to non-persistent data can result in significant
increase in recovery time. Unfortunately, given the significant
costs of system downtime (hundreds of thousands per minute
[30]), completely reconstructing counters and Merkle Tree
parts of non-persistent data at the recovery time can lead to
unanticipated system unavailability.
To avoid an unanticipated long recovery time of rebuilding
counters and Merkle Tree parts of non-persistent regions, we
additionally propose Lazy Recovery of Low-Levels of Non-
Persistent Merkle-Tree. As the number of counter and data
blocks is the largest and they consume most of the rebuilding
time, we can lazily update them as following. By initializing all
intermediate nodes at level 1 (parents of counter blocks) with
zeros, and constructing all upper levels sequentially, we can
obtain an initial root value (or part of root) for non-persistent
data. Later, any update for any counter value, if the parent
intermediate node has a zero value, we do not flag an error or
tampering as the upper levels of Merkle Tree (and root) are
already updated to reflect such value, however, we know that
this is the first write to the counter block after recovery and
hence we zero out (or initialize) the counter value and update
the parent node accordingly. Note that since each counter block
has its MAC value stored in 8 bytes of the 64B parent node,
only the corresponding 8B in the parent node would indicate if
it is the first update after recovery or not. While the odds that
a counter block value would naturally lead to 64-bit zero value
is only 1264 , to avoid falsely assuming an initialized counter
value, if a counter block naturally has a MAC value of 0, we
re-encrypt one of its cachelines and accordingly increment its
minor value and calculate its new MAC value and use it to
update the parent block if new MAC value does not equal to 0.
By lazy update of non-persistent data and counter blocks, we
ensure a recovery process that only needs to iterate over levels
1 or 2 instead of all corresponding data and counter blocks.
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Fig. 7: High-Level Overview of Write Operation on TriadNVM.
Figure 7 depicts the Triad-NVM design. As mentioned
earlier, Write-Pending Queue (WPQ) is considered part of the
persistence domain (power-fail protected domain) in modern
processors [16]. Thus, anything reaches there should be
consistent or there is a way to ensure its consistency. To do
so, each write operation, before being persisted (removed from
volatile buffer), it logs all its corresponding updates (counter,
data, MT nodes and root) to persistent registers inside the
processor and then set a persistent bit (called READY BIT). If
a crash occurs while copying the updates in persistent registers
to WPQ, then when the system restores the memory controller
will attempt to write the persistent registers to NVM (or WPQ)
again. At the time of copying the contents from the registers to
WPQ, Triad-NVM selectively chooses if the counter or Merkle
Tree nodes should be copied to WPQ or it is just enough to
update them in caches (as shown in steps 8 and 9 ). Note
that once a dirty block gets evicted from these caches it will
go to WPQ as usual. Persistent registers can be implemented
as fast NVM registers or volatile registers will be flushed to
slower NVM registers once a crash occurs through leveraging
ADR or residual power. The number of persistent registers
depends on the Triad-NVM model, e.g., if TriadNVM-2 is
used then we only need 5 registers, whereas if we use the
impractical strict persistence then we might need up to 15
registers. Note that using persistent registers have been also
assumed in state-of-the-art work [17].
If the updated encryption counter corresponds to a persistent
memory region, it will be strictly updated (copied to WPQ).
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However, for Merkle Tree, if the updated parts belong to a
persistent memory region and in a level higher than the persist
level, then the updates will be persisted to NVM (copied to
WPQ). Note that the persist level is the highest level of Merkle
Tree that is guaranteed to be strictly persisted, e.g., if such
a level is 2, then counters, their parents and grandparents
are guaranteed to be persisted after each update. Note that
TriadNVM recovery process is as simple as iterative over the
intermediate notes at the persist level and construct the upper
levels of the persistent memory regions, however, additionally
initialize the intermediate nodes of such level to zeros for
non-persistent memory regions before constructing their upper
levels of the tree.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe our evaluation methodology.
Since our work involves kernel modifications and both
persistent and non-persistent applications, we use Gem5
simulator[20] in its full-system mode. The kernel we simulate
is based on Linux Kernel 4.14. Moreover, the disk image
we use is based on Ubuntu 16.04 distribution. The kernel
was initialized with configuring the 4GB starting from 12GB
as a persistent region, e.g., the kernel was initialized with
memmap=4G!12G. Later, the persistent regions was formatted
with DAX-enabled ext4 filesystem and mounted to be used
by persistent applications and libraries. Table I presents the
architectural configurations of our simulated system:
TABLE I: Configuration of the simulated system.
Processor
CPU 8-core, 1GHz, out-of-order x86-64
L1 Cache private, 2 cycles, 32KB, 2-way, 64B block
L2 Cache private, 20 cycles, 512KB, 8-way, 64B block
L3 Cache shared, 32 cycles, 8MB, 64-way, 64B block
DDR-based PCM Main Memory
Capacity 16 GB
PCM Latencies 60ns read, 150ns write [25]
Organization 2 ranks/channel, 8 banks/rank, 1KB row buffer,
Open Adaptive page policy, RoRaBaChCo address map-
ping
DDR Timing tRCD 55ns, tXAW 50ns, tBURST 5ns, tWR 150ns, tRFC
5ns [25], [18]
tCL 12.5ns, 64-bit bus width, 1200 MHz Clock
Encryption Parameters
Counter Cache 128KB, 8-way, 64B block
Merkle-Tree Cache 128KB, 8-way, 64B block
Merkle-Tree 9 levels, 8-ary, 64B blocks on each level
To evaluate the impact of our proposed optimizations,
we run 3 sets of workloads: persistent applications, non-
persistent applications and a combination of both. For the
benchmarks being used, following is the description of the
major applications followed by Table II which shows the mixed
workloads we use. For non-persistent workloads, we use repre-
sentative benchmarks from SPEC2006[22]. We also implement
persistent Hashtable, ArraySwap and Queue benchmarks using
Intel’s PMDK library. Additionally, we implement synthetic
benchmark, DAXBENCH-S-RW that leverages DAX to mmap
a file directly in the persistent region and access it through
memory load/store operations with S stride and RW read to
write ratio. Finally, we use those benchmarks to create multi-
programmed workloads to enable studying the optimizations
that relax persistence of security metadata for non-persistent
data applications.
TABLE II: Mixed Benchmarks
Benchmark Combination
DAXBENCH1 DAXBENCH-128-2
DAXBENCH2 DAXBENCH-1024-2
DAXBENCH3 DAXBENCH-256-2
DAXBENCH4 DAXBENCH-512-3
MIX1 Array-swap, Queue, Hashtable, DAXBENCH-64-
2
MIX2 Mcf, Queue, Hashtable, DAXBENCH-64-2
MIX3 Mcf, LBM, Hashtable, DAXBENCH-512-2
MIX4 Array-swap, Hashtable, Hashtable, DAXBENCH-
1024-2
All applications were fast-forwarded to representative regions
and each run simulated at least 200M instructions.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our proposed optimizations and
study the impact of combining them on Triad-NVM. We will
first study the impact of each optimization on performance, and
later study and analyze the trade-off between recovery-time
and performance overhead when relaxing the persistence of
Merkle Tree.
A. The Impact of Relaxation Schemes on Performance
Figure 8 shows the impact of Triad-NVM on performance.
TriadNVM-N represents TriadNVM with strict persistence of
persistent regions up to the N th level of the Merkle Tree. As
expected, for the persistent region, TriadNVM-1 is expected to
perform better than TriadNVM-2 and TriadNVM-3. The main
reason for that is that less number of writes need to occur
to memory to ensure strict persistence of Merkle Tree, i.e.,
in TriadNVM-1 only the parent of the updated counter block
needs to be persisted along with the counter block, whereas in
TriadNVM-2 both the parent and the grandparent of the updated
counter block need to be persisted along with the counter
block. Clearly, there will be no difference between different
TriadNVM persistence levels for non-persistent workloads, e.g.,
LBM and MCF. Moreover, in mixed workloads, only the writes
to persistent regions will make difference between TriadNVM
models.
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Our results show that using strict persistence scheme can
lead to an average of 2.21x slowdown, whereas TriadNVM-
1, TriadNVM-2 and TriadNVM-3 lead to only 4.9%, 10.1%
and 15.6% performance overheads, respectively. Moreover,
we observe that write-intensive workloads with non-persistent
region allocations, e.g, Libquantum, can get an almost order
of magnitude speed up when using schemes that are aware
of persistent regions and thus relax the requirements of non-
persistent memory ranges.
As mentioned earlier, one major shortcomings of the emerg-
ing NVMs are their slow writes and limited write endurance.
However, while ensuring higher level of persistence would
possibly reduce the recovery time and also avoid single-point
of failures, it can excessively increase the number of writes.
However, more relaxed schemes, e.g., TriadNVM-1, would
lead to additional recovery time and potentially single-point of
failure, however, it incurs smaller number of extra writes.
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Figure 9, shows the total number of times in our simulations
for different schemes for each workload. We can observe that
most applications’ # writes are proportional to the persistence
level, however, since large percentage of writes could be
resulting from natural cache write backs and data persistence,
only the writes result from persisting security metadata would
increase linearly with the level of persistence. We can observe
that for most workloads, the number of writes for TriadNVM
is close to the original number of writes without persisting
security metadata.
B. The Impact on Recovery Time
As mentioned earlier, strict persistence ensures near zero
recovery time, however, at the cost of significant performance
degradation during normal operation. Meanwhile, not persisting
security metadata at all will require creating Merkle Tree and
initializing MAC values in data blocks which requires iterating
over all memory blocks. In contrast, Triad-NVM guarantees
the persistence of the counters and the first level of the Merkle
Tree. To estimate recovery time, we assume that reading a tree
block in addition to calculating its MAC value takes 100ns.
Figure 10 shows the impact of persisting security metadata on
recovery time.
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Recovery Time.
As emerging NVMs are expected to be in terabytes, our goal
is to get an estimation of how long does it take to recover the
whole Merkle Tree for different persistency models. We expect
TriadNVM-3 to have the least recovery time as it requires
the least number of computations; starting the reconstruction
from Level 3. Meanwhile, TriadNVM-2 brings in a tradeoff
between better performance but almost 8x slowdown. In
the case of strict persistency, there is almost zero recovery
time; all parts of Merkle Tree are up to date. As shown
in the figure, the problem becomes more obvious when we
deal with terabytes of memory, e.g., at 1TB the recovery
(construction) time for no-persist scheme is 30 minutes. In
contrast, for TriadNVM-1 it takes only 30.68 seconds to
complete recovery. As system downtime can be in hundreds
of thousands per minute [30], some high-availability systems
might trade performance for faster recovery time. For instance,
if TriadNVM-2 or TriadNVM-3 are used with 1TB of memory,
then the recovery time is 3.83 and 0.48 seconds, respectively.
We can also observe that when the memory 8TB, the recovery
time is almost 8x slower than that of 1TB, due to linear increase
in number of nodes/blocks to iterate through to calculate MAC
values. While TriadNVM can be configured to persist up to
any specific value, we leave the decision of which level to
persist to up to system integrator or administrator and based
on the acceptable performance/recovery-time trade-off. Note
that such a decision can be also affected by the crash rate and
possibility of system failures in addition to how sensitive the
data is and tolerance to declaring them unverifiable at recovery
time.
As resilience of the system is also important, TriadNVM-2
and TriadNVM-3 provide a higher resolution of pinpointing
errors. In TriadNVM-2, if calculating the MAC values starting
from level 2 does not eventually generate the root value stored
in the processor, then TriadNVM restarts form level 1 and find
out which node in Level 2 does not match with that calculated
from its children, and hence only declaring the corresponding
32KB as unverifiable. Note that the root must match with that
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generated from those in Level 1, before declaring that Level-2
node to be the source of error. Similarily, if an uncorrectable
error occurs in Level-1 nodes, while Level-2 nodes ended
up generating the same root value, i.e, verified, then we can
use Level-2 nodes to pinpoint which Level-1 node is the
corrupted one. TriadNVM-3 follows the same logic but now
add an additional level of isolation in case uncorrectable errors
occurred on both Level 1 and Level 2. It is also important to
note that since the number of levels of Level-2 and Level-3 are
8 and 64 times, respectively, smaller than that of Level-1, then
the chances of uncorrectable errors on them is also smaller.
VI. RELATED WORK
Persisting security metadata has been rarely studied up until
recently. Recent work [18] proposed selective persistence of
encryption counters without any discussion of how Merkle
Tree persistence can be handled. Moreover, as discussed
earlier, selective encryption counter is vulnerable to known-
plaintext attacks as it allows the reuse of encryption counters
for non-persistent data. In contrast, our work takes a more
holistic approach of studying all relevant security metadata and
discuss their persistence impact on recovery-time, resilience
and performance. Additionally, we propose solutions to mitigate
such overheads and to protect against potential repetition of
one-time pad.
Recently, Zuo et al.[19] proposed combining multiple
updates of encryption counter block into one write to memory,
especially for large transactions. Unfortunately, such a solution
works only well if we can predict the spatial locality of
writes to memory, which is typically hard to predict as they
can result and interfere with evictions/write-backs from the
Last-Level Cache (LLC). Thus, such a solution would be
beneficial only when many writes to memory are spatially
contagious and occur at relatively close time. In contrast, our
solutions are generic and do not expect any special behavior
from workloads. Additionally, we investigate Merkle Tree
persistence, which has not been discussed or explored in any of
the previous work we are aware of. Nevertheless, SecPM can be
orthogonally augmented with our proposed solutions. Another
recent work explore repurposing Error-Correcting Codes (ECC)
to be additionally used as a sanity-check for the encryption
counter [17]. By doing so, Ye et al.[17] propose a novel scheme
that can be used to relax the persistence of encryption counters
and rely on restoring it through trying several values until
ECC match or indicate natural number of errors. Our work is
orthogonal to Osiris and can be integrated with it to reduce the
number of writes to persist counters in the persistent memory
regions.
Persisting data in NVMs have different models based on the
required software and hardware changes[31], [10], [32], [33].
Several APIs and libraries have been developed for the purpose
of persisting data in emerging NVMs and utilizing the OS
support for PMEM, e.g., Intel’s PMDK [21]. In this paper, our
support focuses on persisting security metadata accompanying
persistent data when being written to NVM, and thus we do
not require any changes at application or library level, hence
Triad-NVM can be integrated with most persistency models.
Other works that target reducing NVM writes have not
considered the problem of persisting security metadata [6],
[7]. All of these solutions can employ TriadNVM to ensure
persistence and recoverability of security metadata.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose TriadNVM, a set of schemes that
enable efficient, resilient and performance-friendly recovery
mechanism for security metadata. TriadNVM ensures the
persistence of Merkle Tree and encryption metadata while
incurring minimial overheads. Moreover, TriadNVM can be
customized to different modes based on the desired recovery-
time/performance trade-offs.
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